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RECENT DECISIONS

WILLS-INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE-INCORPORATION OF AN
IMMATERIALLY AMENDED TRUST ALLOwED.-Testator made a be-

quest to the trustees of an amendable trust. Subsequently, the trust
was amended twice. The bequest was attacked as being in violation
of the rule against incorporation by reference. In unanimously affirming the decisions of the Surrogate and the Appellate Division, the
Court of Appeals held that a bequest, referring to a trust in which
minor administrative changes had been made subsequent to the execution of the will, did not offend the rule. In re Ivie's Will, 4 N.Y.2d
178, 149 N.E.2d 725, 173 N.Y.S.2d 293 (1958).
A devise or bequest is ordinarily invalid unless it is in writing,
subscribed and attested in the manner provided by statute.'
The
doctrine of incorporation by reference, recognized in England 2 and
in many states, 3 allows an instrument, whether or not it meets these
requirements, to be incorporated into a will merely by making reference to it.4 However, the testator's intent to incorporate must be
certain r and the instrument must be in existence at the time the will
is executed. 6 It must also be precisely and adequately defined therein.7
Because of the danger of fraud 8 and circumvention of the statute of
wills, 9 courts employ extreme care in their application of the doctrine.

I See,

e.g., N.Y. DECED. EST. LAW § 21.

See Bizzey v. Flight, [1876] 3 Ch. D. 269; Allen v. Maddock, 11 Moore
P.C. 427, 14 Eng. Rep. 757 (1858).
2

3 See, e.g., Newhall v. Newhall, 280 Ill. 199, 117 N.E. 476 (1917) ; Shulsky

v. Shulsky, 98 Kan. 69, 157 Pac. 407 (1916) ; Taft v. Stearns, 234 Mass. 273,
125 N.E. 570 (1920).
4 See ATKINSON, WIu.s 385-94 (2d ed. 1953) ; 1 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 54.1 (2d
ed. 1956).
See Matter of Piffard, 111 N.Y. 410, 18 N.E. 718 (1888); In re
McCurdy's Estate, 197 Cal. 276, 240 Pac. 498 (1925).
6 See Estate of Shillaber, 74 Cal. 144, 15 Pac. 453 (1887); Appeal of
Sleeper, 129 Me. 194, 151 AtI. 150 (1930) (dictum).
7 See Thayer v. Wellington, 91 Mass. (9 Allen) 283 (1864); Sheldon v.
Sheldon, 1 Rob. Ecc. 82, 163 Eng. Rep. 972 (1844). For a general discussion
of the conditions in relation to trusts, see 1 Scott, TRUSTS § 54.1 (2d ed. 1956).
See also 1 PAGF, WILLS §242 (lifetime ed. 1901) for a discussion of the distinction between incorporation by reference and the doctrine that a will may
be written on separate pieces of paper.
8 "Obviously an unrestricted recognition of incorporation of unattested
papers into wills would open the door to fraud and in addition may be said
to violate the spirit of the requirements of execution." ATKINSON, WIu.S
386 (2d ed. 1953). However, even without the aid of the doctrine, courts go
outside the will. See, e.g., Dennis v. Holsopple, 148 Ind. 297, 47 N.E. 631
(1897), allowing a bequest to persons who might have nursed and clothed
testator when he was in need; Metcalf v. Sweeney, 17 R.I. 213, 21 Atl. 364
(1891), determining whether plaintiff was within a bequest to servants in
testator's employ at his death. Similarly an invalid will may be incorporated
by a subsequently executed valid will, although New York limits this doctrine
largely to cases in which the original will was invalid for reason of lack of
testamentary capacity. In re Brown's Estate, 6 M.2d 803, 160 N.Y.S.2d 761
(Surr. Ct. 1957).
9 See Hatheway v. Smith, 79 Conn. 506, 65 Atl. 1058 (1907); Philps v.
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In New York, when the instrument itself meets the statutory
requirements it may properly be incorporated.' ° The courts will
also go outside the will merely to explain a term in the will." In
at least one case the court went outside the will to determine the
amount of the bequest. 1 2 This would appear to be a recognition of
the doctrine of "independent significance." Although it is said that
the doctrine of incorporation by reference is not recognized, 13 nonrecognition will not be carried to a "drily logical extreme." 14
Apparently the courts Will sometimes 15 allow incorporation if by so
doing the obvious intent of the testator will be effected. Matter of
Rausch 16 established that an unamendable trust may be incorporated
by reference.' 7 The ultimate basis for that decision is not clear. In
the opinion, Judge Cardozo stated:
Here the extrinsic fact, identifying and explaining the gift already made, is
as impersonal and enduring as the inscription on a monument....
A father bequeaths a legacy to his son by cancelling whatever indebtedness
appears upon his books. No one doubts the validity of such a gift ....
Yet
to understand the extent of the legacy we must go beyond the will itself.
,-18
"Signs and symbols" must be turned "into their equivalent realities ....

This language appears to approximate the "independent significance"
doctrine. The opinion goes on to state that "the rule against incorporation is not a doctrinaire demand for an unattainable perfection." 19
It would appear that the doctrine of incorporation by reference or
that of "independent significance" could support the decision.
Robbins, 40 Conn. 250, 271-72 (1873); Note, 17 MINN. L. REv. 527, 533-38
(1933); 12 MiNx. L. REV. 769, 770 (1928); AxrKisoN, WILLS 386 (2d ed.
1953).
10 The most common example of this is the incorporation by reference of
another's will. See Matter of Fowles, 222 N.Y. 222, 118 N.E. 611 (1918).
"I See In. re Latz' Estate, 95 N.Y.S.2d 584 (Surr. Ct. 1950) ; In re Utter's
Will, 173 Misc. 1069, 20 N.Y.S.2d 457 (Surr. Ct. 1940).
12 Langdon v. Astor's Executors, 16 N.Y. 9 (1857).
13 See DAVID, N.Y. LAw OF WILLS § 436 (1923).
"The New York law is
well established that documents or instruments which have not been executed
in accordance with the requirements of section 21 of the Decedent Estate Law
cannot be incorporated in a will by reference." In re Snyder's Will, 125
N.Y.S.2d 459, 460 (Surr. Ct. 1953). For an earlier case in New York, see
Booth v. Baptist Church, 126 N.Y. 215, 28 N.E. 238 (1891). But see Caulfield
v. Sullivan, 85 N.Y. 153 (1881); Brown v. Clark, 77 N.Y. 369 (1879).
14 Matter of Rausch, 258 N.Y. 327, 331, 179 N.E. 755, 756 (1932).
Mr.
Justice Holmes originated the phrase in Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S.
104, 110 (1911).
15 See notes 5, 6 & 7 supra and accompanying text.
16 258 N.Y. 327, 179 N.E. 755 (1932).
17 Although this is accepted as the holding of the case, nowhere in the opinion does Judge Cardozo mention that the trust is unamendable. However, that
it is unamendable is shown in President & Directors of the Manhattan Co.
v. Janowitz, 260 App. Div. 174, 21 N.Y.S.2d 232 (2d Dep't 1940), and In re
Snyder's Will, 125 N.Y.S.2d 459 (Surr. Ct. 1953).
1s Matter of Rausch, 258 N.Y. 327, 332, 179 N.E. 755, 756 (1932).
19 Id. at 332, 179 N.E. at 757.
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In the subsequent case of President and Directors of the Man-

hattan Co. v. JanowitZ,20 a bequest to a trust which had been substan-

tially amended subsequent to the execution of the will was not allowed.
The court stated that the substantial change by amendment eliminated
all independent significance. However, despite amendment, it would
seem that the trust still had independent significance, 2' and therefore, if the underlying concept of the Rausch case was "independent
significance," the Janowitz case would be difficult to reconcile. Subsequently, Janowitz was refined by In re Snyder's Will,22 where a
bequest was allowed to an amendable trust which actually had not
been amended after execution of the will. Once again, the conclusion
can be sustained under either doctrine.
In extending the Snyder case, the principal case affirms it. Since
the amendment was found immaterial, it is not within Janowitz' rule.
The Court of Appeals, however, would also seem to have tacitly accepted Janowitz, since the principal case could have been more easily
decided if the Court had chosen to overrule it. Thus, in New York
today, a trust that is unamendable, or one that is amendable but in
fact has not subsequently been amended, may be incorporated. One
which is subsequently substantially amended may not be; one that is
immaterially changed may be. Just where the line is to be drawn is
left unanswered.
No valid reason seems to exist for these distinctions. The reasons for upholding incorporation in one case uphold it in all. If
the intent of the testator is certain and the possibility of fraud is
eliminated, the incorporation of all formal trust instruments should
be allowed. Certainly with the solemnity surrounding this type of
trust there is virtually no chance of fraud. As Judge Cardozo indicated, little difference exists between leaving money to a trustee
who is bound by the trust agreement, and leaving money to a corporation which is bound by its corporate charter. Yet one would
hardly doubt the validity of a bequest to a corporation, although a
corporation may subsequently have its corporate charter amended. 23

20
260 App. Div. 174, 21 N.Y.S.2d 232 (2d Dep't 1940).
21
This situation seems analogous to a bequest to employees at death. There
the bequest is allowed despite the fact that the identity of the employees might
have changed between the making of the will and the death of the testator.
See Dennis v. Holsopple, 148 Ind. 297, 47 N.E. 631 (1897). Likewise a gift
to a corporation will be allowed although its charter may be substantially
changed. See Matter of Rausch, 258 N.Y. 327, 331, 179 N.E. 755, 756 (1932)
(dictum).
22 125 N.Y.S.2d 459 (Surr. Ct. 1953).
23 In both instances there is legal obligation to use the money according to
either the trust agreement or the corporate charter. See Matter of Rausch,
258 N.Y. 327, 331, 179 N.E. 755, 756 (1932). For general discussions of the
Rausch case, see Notes, 17 MIN. L. Rzv. 527 (1933), 6 U. CINN. L. REv. 295

(1932); 9 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 507 (1932); 7

NOTRE DAmE

LAw. 541 (1932).

